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THE ACT AND ITS BACKGROUND.

HE National Labor Relations Act, commonly called the Wagner Labor Disputes Act, was signed by President Roosevelt

To many people it seemed a novel and even

on July 5, 1935.'
2

radical experiment. Most of the Act was in fact not new, but
the product of the long experience of the federal government in
dealing with labor problems since 1877.1 Its substantive and
procedural provisions were based upon earlier statutes,4 not all of
*Professors of Law, University of Alabama.
'Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. at L. 449-457; 29 U. S. C. A. secs.
151-166, 2 Mason's U. S: Code, tit. 29, secs. 151-166.
'The opinion of Judge Otis in Stout v. Pratt, (D.C. Mo. 1935) 12 F.
Supp. 864 is not an isolated example of adverse criticism of the Act. Said
Judge Otis, at pages 869-870:
"There is now pending in Congress a resolltion to amend the Constitution. The first section of the proposed amendment is this: 'The Congress
shall have power by laws uniform in their geographical operation to regulate commerce, business, industry, finance, banking, insurance, manufactures,
transportation, agriculture, and the production of natural resources.' When
that proposed amendment has been submitted and ratified the statute now
under consideration, in the respects considered here, if then re-enacted,
certainly will be constitutional. But not until then. Then also what yet
remains of the sovereignty of the states will cease to be and the 'citizen'
will have become a 'subject.'"
For the opinion of the Lawyers' Committee of the Liberty League, see
infra, note 33.
3(1936) First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board,
1-8. As to when the labor problem first became national in scope, see
Bonney, Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes, (1923) 7 MiNNEsor-A
LAW REviEw 467, 468-69.

4
"The National Labor Relations Act came into existence essentially
as a continuation of section 7 (a) of the N. I. R. A.." citing, inter alia a
statement by Senator Wagner, N. Y. Times, May 25, 1935. Note in (1935)
35 Colum. L. Rev. 1098-1128. The Federal Trade Commission Act, (15
U.S.C.A. sec. 45, 1 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 15, sec. 45) furnished "a

procedural pattern [for the Wagner Act] which has been repeatedly ap-

proved as an appropriate and constitutional method for the administration
of federal law." (1936) First Annual Report of the National Labor
Relations Board 11.

See also the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. at
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which dealt with labor, however ;5 nor had they all been upheld by
the Supreme Court."
The Act was passed to encourage collective bargaining between
employers and workers in businesses subject to federal control.
In general, under the Act, employers may not interfere with proper
union activities of workers, and are required to recognize and
deal with representatives of a majority of workers as their sole
bargaining agency, whenever the workers can agree upon who
shall represent them.' The Act is based on the theory that
strikes in many businesses and industries may be burdens upon
interstate or foreign commerce, which is subject to regulation by
the federal government; and that the federal government may
therefore encourage collective bargaining in order to discourage
strikes."
L. 1449, amended in 1934, 48 Stat. at L. 1185, 45 U. S. C. A. sec. 151,
3 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 45, sec. 151; Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 641, 645.
5
The Federal Trade Commission Act, for example, 15 U. S. C. A.
sec. 45, 1 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 15, sec. 45.
6Schechter v. United States, (1935) 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837,
79 L. Ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R. 947, holding unconstitutional the National
Industrial Recovery Act.
729 U. S. C. A. sec. 157, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 157:
[Sec. 7] "Right of employees as to organization, collective bargaining, etc.
"Employees shall have the rigjit to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
29 U. S. C. A. sec. 159 (a), 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 159(a)
[sec. 9 (a)] "Representatives of employees for collective bargaining; . . .
"(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate-for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer."
829 U. S. C. A. sec. 151, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 151:
[Sec. 1] "Findings and declaration of policy.
"The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and
the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have
the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce. ...
"Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from
injury, impairment or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce
by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest,
by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers
and employees."
Compare the opinion of the Supreme Court in Schechter v. United
States, (1935) 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R.
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In addition to the provision of the Act asserting the right of
employees to organize themselves into labor unions and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing,9 the
Act defines unfair labor practices on the part of the employers and
forbids them as interfering with the rights of employees." To
guarantee these rights the National Labor Relations Board is
created as the administrative agency of the federal government."
Procedure under the Act, from the point of view of the aggrieved individual, is simple. A charge is made to the National
Labor Relations Board, which then determines its jurisdiction in
the dispute ;12 the board or its agent may thereupon issue a complaint and hold a hearing. Evidence is taken and a decision is
reached on the merits of the case.13 If the decision is that the
employee has been injured by unfair labor practices, the board
has power to issue a "cease-and-desist order," requiring the person complained of to stop violating the rights of the employee,
947, where Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said: "The power of Congress extends not only to the regulation of transactions which are part of interstate
commerce, but to the protection of that commerce from injury. It matters
not that the injury may be due to the conduct of those engaged in intrastate9 operations," [if such conduct "affects" interstate commerce directly.]
Section 7 of the Act. 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 157, 2 Mason's U. S.
Code, tit. 29, sec. 157, see note 7, supra.
1029 U. S. C. A. sec. 158, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 158;
[Sec. 8] "Unfair labor practices by employer defined.
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of' rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title [that is, to organize and
bargain collectively].
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it...
(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization....
(4) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he-has filed charges or given testimony under this chapter.
(5) To refuse to bargain collectively .. "
1129 U. S. C. A. sec. 153, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 153.
13229

U. S. C. A. sec. 160 (b).

"The Board is given no blanket authority over all employers and
employees in all industry, even in the restricted field of labor relations in
which the Act operates. Jurisdiction is limited to the investigation of
questions 'affecting commerce' concerning the representation of employees
(Sec. 9 (c), and to the prevention of unfair labor practices 'affecting
commerce' (sec. 10 (a))." (1936) First Ann. Rep., National Labor
Relations Board 11. The jurisdiction of the board is, of course, subject to
review.

1aThe opinions of the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations

Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, (1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 615. 617,
and in Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, (1937) 57
Sup. Ct. 650, 651, describe well the most important procedural steps under
the Act.
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or it may be an affirmative order such as the facts of the case
may justify. 14

Should the person against whom the order is

issued fail to conform to it, there is, up to this point, no sanction provided by the Act which can make him do so. 5 The
board may, however, then petition the proper circuit court of
appeals to enforce its order. If the order of the board is affirmed by the court, the delinquent person must comply under
penalty of contempt.16
The jurisdiction of the board is limited to businesses in which
labor disturbances will constitute a burden on interstate or foreign
commerce. 17 The Act does not confer on the federal government any general authority over all business.' s
The federal government has been involved in labor controversies, directly or indirectly, for more than half a century, by
presidential intervention, through arbitration, as a policeman to
keep the peace by military force,' 9 or through injunction in the
1429 U. S. C. A. sec. 160 (c), 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 160 (c)
. If upon all the testimony taken the board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in
any such unfair labor practice, then the board shall state its findings of
fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to
take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this chapter .. "
"5Except as provided for in section 12 of the Act (29 U. S. C. A. sec.
162, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 162) : "Any person who shall willfully
resist, prexent, impede, or interfere with any member of the board or any of
its agents or agencies in the performance of duties pursuant to this chapter
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or by imprisonment
for not more than one year, or both."
loSubject to review of course, as in other decisions of the circuit
courts of appeals, by the Supreme Court. 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 160 (e),
2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 160 (e).
17(1936) First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board
11, note 12, supra. And see the definition of "commerce" as used throughout
the Act, 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 152 (6), 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 152
(6).
' A somewhat different view evidently was entertained by Judge Otis
when he wrote the opinion in Stout v. Pratt, (D.C. Mo. 1935) 12 F.
Supp. 864, 866: "It so clearly applies, and was intended to apply, to all
employers and employees in all industry, that it was thought necessary by
Congress to expressly except from its provisions such employment as
children by their parents and of that of domestic servants. Sec 2(3), 29
U. S. C. A. 152 (3), 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 152 (3). If a
father has three sons employed by him in a family enterprise, he still may
bargain individually with each; he is not required to bargain with the
representatives of the majority."
19See Bonney, Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes, (1923)
7
MINNESOTA LAw REVIEw 467, 468-69: ". . . There was no national problem
calling for federal intervention before 1877 .... The approach of the national
status of the problem is merely foreshadowed by the disturbances of this
year. . . . The great southwestern strike of 1886 announced its arrival."
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federal courts,:" principally against employees. On the ground
of interference with interstate commerce or transportation of the
mail, it has sought to end strikes." The legislative branch of
the federal government has not been deaf to the interests of
labor.-" Congress has time and again passed acts designed to
give back to labor the bargaining power of which it was deprived
long ago in England by the ancient Statutes of Laborers?2 But
as often as Congress has attempted to restore to labor this lost
bargaining power, the decisions have construed it away. An example of labor legislation later nullified by the courts i.s the
Erdman Act of 1898, which was the basis of the decision in
Adair v. United States.24 Not only have acts of Congress intended as an aid to labor been struck down by the courts, but
at least one piece of legislation which was perhaps not intended
to be used in the economic conflict as a weapon against labor,
has been turned by the courts into such a weapon. "
20(1936) First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board
1; Landis, Cases on Labor Law 37, 287, 503; Brandeis, J., dissenting in
Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 366, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed.
254, 279; In re Debs, Petitioner, (1895) 158 U. S. 564, 581, 15 Sup. Ct.
900, 39 L. Ed. 1092, 1101. And see the opinion of Judge Amidon in Great
Northern
Ry. Co. v. Brosseau, (D.C. N.D. 1923) 286 Fed. 414.
21
In re Debs, (1895) 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092.
See note following the Debs Case in Landis, Cases on Labor Law 496, 510;
Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction 1-24.
22(1936) First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board
1-3; Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, (1932) 16 MvN EsorA LAW
REviEw 638. "In a striking series of cases decided between 1908 and 1923,

the Supreme Court nullified a variety of efforts on the part of Congress

to benefit the working classes. These decisions dealt, in a manner uniformly
adverse to the interest of labor and favorable to the actual or apparent
interests of business, with unionization, employers liability, workmen's
compensation, child labor, and a minimum wage for women." Edgerton,
The Incidence of Judicial Control over Congress, (1937) 22 Cornell L.
Q. 299,
23 325-26.
See Landis, Cases on Labor Law 1-3.
24(1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas.
764. 5Compare (1937) 22 Cornell L. Q. 299, 326.
2 "Finally, when the Democrats gained control of all branches of the
government, the Clayton Act was enacted and labor heralded the labor
sections of this measure as a combined magna charta and bill of rights.
Within a few years, these sections were construed by the Supreme Court
to have made no change in the law except to confer the right of trial by
jury in a restricted class of contempt cases." Witte, The Federal AntiInjunction Act, (1932) 16 IfNNESOTA LAw REvIEw 638.
There is, however, a difference of opinion as to whether the Sherman
Act of 1890 was intended to include labor combinations. See Landis, Cases
on Labor Law 37.
"The Sherman Law was held in United States v. United States Steel
Corporation, (1920) 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293, 64 L. Ed. 348,
8 A. L. R. 1121, to permit capitalists to combine in a single corporation fifty

per cent of the steel industry of the United States, dominating the trade
through its vast resources.

The Sherman Law was held in United States
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Among the immediate precursors of the National Labor Relations Act were the War Labor Board and the Railway Labor
Act of 1926.26 The Wagner Act has borrowed a number of
features from them. The War Labor Board, among other things,
was designed to protect the union activities of workers. 27 Under
the Railway Labor Act of 1926, Congress used its power to regulate commerce among the states to control labor disputes in
cases involving railways where the disputes might constitute an
obstruction to interstate commerce.28 Thus it is apparent that
the
"board was created not as a completely new experiment in
the field of labor relations but as the result of cumulative experience of many years during which various ways to deal with
labor relations have been tried by the federal government." 2

II.

SUPREIME COURT DECISIONS ON THE WAGNER

LABOR Acr.

A. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT.

The five decisions of the Supreme Court"0 upholding the
v. United Shoe Machinery Company, (1918) 247 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 473, 63 L. Ed. 986, to permit capitalists to combine in another corporation practically the whole shoe industry of the country, necessarily
giving it a position of dominance over shoe manufacturing in America.
It would, indeed, be strange if Congress had by the same act willed to deny
to members of a small craft of workingmen the right to co-operate in simply
refraining from work, when that course was the only means of self-protection
against a combination of militant and powerful employers. I cannot believe
that Congress did so." Branders, J., dissenting in Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association of North America (1927)
274 U. S. 37, 65, 71 L. Ed. 916, 928, 47 Sup. Ct. 522, 54 A. L. R. 791, 806.
26
The War Labor Board was created by presidential proclamation,
April 8, 1918. See Gregg, The National War Labor Board, (1919) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 39. And see (1936) First Annual Report of the National
Labor Relations Board 2-3. The Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. at L.
1449, (amended in 1934), was upheld in Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S. S. Clerks, (1930) 281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427, 74
L. Ed. 1034.
27
See the principles and policies of the War Labor Board, as sanctioned
by the president's proclamation, set out in Mr. Gregg's article, The National
War Labor Board, (1919) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 39, 42.
28
Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, (1930)
281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427, 74 L. Ed. 1034.
209(1936) First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board,
1.
3ONational Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, (1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 615; National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf
Trailer Co., (1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 642; National Labor Relations Board v.
Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., (1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 645; Associated
Press v. National Labor Relations Board, (1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 650; Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
(1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 648. See Mueller, Businesses Subject to the National
Labor Relations Act, (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1286.
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National Labor Relations Act3" involved several constitutional
questions. Most important of these were, first the constitutionality of the Act per se, and, second, the limits of its constitutional
application.
The basic constitutionality of the Act was affirmed in the
Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Company Case3" by
a unanimous opinion of the Court, holding that the Act was not an
unconstitutional attempt to regulate intrastate as well as interstate
commerce. In view of the fact that eminent lawyers "had expressed positive doubts as to the possibility of such a holding,"
an examination of its basis in previous decisions of the Court on
the question of Congressional power under the commerce clause
of the constitution" will help not only in understanding the implications of the Coach Company Case, but the other four Wagner
Act decisions also.
In 1908 the Supreme Court of the United States had before
it the case of Adair v. United States, 35 involving the constitutionality of the Erdman Act of 1898, section 10 of which provided that
"'any employer subject to the provisions of this act and any
officer, agent, or receiver of such employer, who shall require
any employ6, or any person seeking employment, as a condition
of such employment, to enter into an agreement, either written
or verbal, not to become or remain a member of any labor corporation, association, or organization; or shall threaten any employ6 with loss of employment, or shall unjustly discriminate
against any employ6 because of his membership in such a labor
corporation, association, or organization, .

.

. is hereby delared

to be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof in
any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction . . .
shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not less than one
hundred dollars and not more than one thousand dollars."
The indictment in the case charged that the defendant Adair,
being an agent of a railroad company engaged in interstate com31
Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. at L. 449-457; 29 U. S. C. A.
secs. 32151-166, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, secs. 151-166.
Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Rel.
Board, (1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 648.
33,-.. We have no hesitancy in concluding that it [the National Labor
Relations Act] is unconstitutional and that it constitutes a complete departure from our constitutional and traditional theories of government."
The Lawyers' Committee of the Liberty League, Sept. 19. 1935.
34
United States constitution, art. I, sec. 8: "The Congress shall have
power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian Tribes."
35(1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436. 13 Ann. Cas. 764.
The Erdman Act is the Act of June 1, 1898. 30 Stat. at L. 424. ci. 370.
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merce and subject to the provisions of the act, had discharged
one Coppage from its service because of his membership in a labor
organization. Mr. Justice Harlan, giving the opinion of the
Court, held, first that it was a violation of the fifth amendment
for Congress to make it a crime to discharge a workman with
whom there was no contract for a fixed term because he was
a member of a labor organization. The Court said:
" * . . It was the defendant Adair's right-and that right
inhered in his personal liberty and was a right of propertyto serve his employer as best he could, so long as he did nothing
that was reasonably forbidden by law as injurious tcf the public
interests."
In the second place the Court decided that there was no
"such connection between interstate commerce and membership in a labor organization as to authorize Congress to make it
a crime against the United States for an agent of an interstate
carrier to discharge an employe because of such membership on
his part. If such a power exists in Congress it is difficult to
perceive why it might not, by absolute regulation, require interstate carriers, under penalties, to employ in the conduct of its
interstate business only such members of labor organizations, or
only those who are not members of such organizations-a power
which could not be recognized as existing under the constitution
of the United States."
In short, the Adair Case held that the right of an employer to
fire employees not under contract is protected by the fifth amendment against Congressional interference, and that, moreover, labor
organizations in industries admittedly in interstate commerce
"have nothing to do with interstate commerce as such." Justices
Holmes and McKenna dissented in separate opinions.
On both these points the Washington. Virginia and Maryland
Coach Company Case seems to reach very different conclusions.
In that case the Coach Company operated motor busses for hire
between points in the District of Columbia and Virginia. A
charge was filed with the National Labor Relations Board by the
Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor
Coach Employees of America, alleging the discharge of drivers
and garage workmen for union activity, in violation of section 8.
subd. (1) and (3), and section 2, subd. (6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, forbidding unfair labor practices?
3629 U. S. C. A. sec. 158 (1), (3), 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29,
sec. 158 (1), (3), (See note 10, supra.) ; 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 152 (6), (7),
2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 152 (6), (7).
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The board rendered its decision, 7 setting forth its findings
of fact, and issued an order against the Coach Company, which
admitted the interstate character of its business. The Coach
Company did not comply with the order of the board, which
then petitioned the circuit court of appeals for the fourth circuit.
The court entered a decree upholding the Act and enforcing the
order of the board.38 Judge Soper, speaking for the court, held
that if the findings of fact of the board were supported by evidence, they would not be inquired into, that the Act was not a
denial of due process of law guaranteed by the fifth amendment,
and that the power given to the board by the Act to prevent unfair labor practices in interstate commerce was properly exercised. This judgment of the circuit court of appeals was unanimously affirmed by the Supreme Court. In the argument before
the circuit court of appeals the Coach Company relied on Adair
4
v. United States3 9 and its companion case, Coppage v. Kansas,
involving a state statute and its validity under the fourteenth
amendment. Said Judge Soper:
"in the first case, an act of Congress was declared unconstitutional which made it a misdemeanor for .a common carrier
to discriminate against its employees by discharge or otherwise
because of membership in a labor union; and in the second case,
a state law was declared invalid which made it unlawful for any
individual to coerce or influence any person to enter into an agreement not to join a labor union as a condition of securing or continuing in employment.
"These citations are not irrelevant, especially Adair v. United
States, because there, as here, a carrier engaged in interstate commerce, in the commonly accepted meaning of the term, was involved, and vigorous argument was advanced by counsel for the
United States and by the dissenting justices to sustain the act as
a reasonable exercise of the power of Congress to regulate commerce between the states. But the difficulties which these decisions oppose to the validity of the National Labor Relations
Act seem to us to have been removed by the more recent unanimous decision of the Court in Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Ry.
Clerks, interpreting the Railway Labor Act of 1926 ...
"The Supreme Court held that the act conferred the right
of independent self-organization upon the employees, free from
interference on the part of the employer enforceable by the courts.
87(1936) 1 N. L. R. B. 769.
8885 F. (2d) 990 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1936).
39(1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas.
764.
960.

40(1915) 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441, L. R. A. 1915C
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and that the prohibition upon the carrier was not a violation of
the fifth amendment, since it did not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the carrier to select its employees and discharge them. On this ground Adair v. United State and Coppage
v. Kansas were distinguished. The court said (281 U.S. 548,
570): 'The petitioners invoke the principle declared in Adair v.
United States and Coppage v. Kansas, but these decisions are inapplicable. The Railway Labor Act of 1926 does not interfere
with the normal exercise of the right of the carrier to select its
employees or to discharge them. The statute is not aimed at this
right of the employers but at interference with the right of the
employees to have representatives of their own choosing. As the
carriers subject to the act have no constitutional right to interfere with the freedom of the employees in making their selection,
they cannot complain of the statute on constitutional grounds.' "
The status of Adair v. United States, after the decision of
the Supreme Court in the Texas & N. 0. Ry. Case was certainly
not clear.41 Under the Adair Case the employer had a constitutional right to hire and fire for any reason or for no reason. The
Railway Labor Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, meant
that the employer could constitutionally be prohibited from interfering with the right of employees to have represehtatives of
their own choosing. Under the decision in the Texas & N. 0.
Ry. Carse, interpreting that Act, could the employer assert the
right that was guaranteed him in the Adair Case, and discharge
every workman who attempted to secure representatives of his
own choosing by joining a labor union? True, it is possible to
reconcile the cases on the superficial and unsatisfactory ground
that "the employee's right to freedom from restraint during the
period of employment does not conflict with the employer's right
arbitrarily to terminate that period.

' 42

If this is the true dis-

tinction, and Adair v. United States continued to be law after
the decision in the Texas & N. 0. Ry. Case, it is clear that the
latter is not adequate as a precedent in the Wagner Act cases of
April 12, 1937. In the words of the Court, the distinction lies in
the fact that under the Railway Labor Act there is no interference
with the "normal exercise" of the right of the carrier to select its
employees or to discharge them. On what theory can it be said
that the employer was not indulging in the "normal exercise" of
that right in the Texas & N. 0. Ry. Case, and so could be pre41
See Willis. Constitutional Law of the United States 896, 921:
Edgerton, The Incidence of Judicial Control over Congress, (1937) 22
Cornell L. Q. 299, 326.
42Note in (1935) 19 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 598.
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vented from the acts in question, but that the employer was in the
"normal exercise" of that right in the Adair Case? Perhaps it is
merely another example of those not infrequent opinions in which
the law is laid down with "seemingly studious obscurity," in which
we cannot help but leave it. But one may wonder at the unwisdora, from the public's point of view, of leaving intact conflicting
lines of authority upon which a court may rely at choice, to reach
unpredictable results.
Relevant here also is another case-Virginian Railway Company v. System Federation No. 40.'" This was a suit by System
Federation No. 40, Railway Employees Department, American
Federation of Labor, representing employees of the Virginian
Railway Company, against that Company. After an election
conducted ly the National Mediation Board, the board certified
the System Federation No. 40 as the representative of six crafts
for purposes of collective bargaining. The railroad refused to
recognize the federation, which then sought by this suit to require the railroad to treat with it, and to enjoin the railroad from
interfering with the employees in choosing representatives for the
purposes of collective bargaining. The trial court granted the
relief prayed for," with exceptions. This was affirmed by the
circuit court of appeals, 45 in an opinion by Judge Parker, who
said :46
"One purpose of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, was
to insure free and untrammeled action on the part of the employees in the choice of their representatives for the purpose of
collective bargaining; and it is a violation of the terms, as well
as of the spirit of the act, for the employer to address arguments
to the employees couched in such terms, or presented in such
manner, as to lead the employee to fear that he may suffer from
the action of the employer if he does not follow the wishes of
the latter in making his choice of representatives. Collective bargaining would be a delusion and a snare if the employer were
permitted to exert pressure of any sort upon the employee with
respect to a matter of this kind."
One may question how a statute of the sort here dealt with
can be upheld unless the Adair Case is overruled. On the point
of due process under the fifth amendment, Judge Parker simply
referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Texas
N. 0. Ry. Case, adding :47
43(1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 592.
44(D.C.
Va. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 621.
44 5 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 641.
6(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 641, 643.
47 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 641, 652.
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"The act does not require of the carrier the making of any
agreement. It does not interfere with the normal exercise of the
right of the carrier to select its employees or to discharge them.
The requirement that the carrier recognize and treat with the
chosen representatives of the employees is but an attempt to
'facilitate the amicable settlement of disputes which threaten the
service of the necessary agencies of interstate transportation,' as
applied by the Supreme Court in the [Texas & N. 0. Railway
Company] Case...
"We cannot see anything arbitrary or unreasonable in requiring that the carrier recognize the representatives of its employees
and treat with them as such; and we do not understand on what
theory the carrier can 48be said to be deprived of liberty or property
by such requirement.
The discussion of the scope of the power of Congress under
the commerce clause is much fuller. It upholds in broad terns"
a plenary power in Congress to regulate interstate commerce
which may be exercised to protect it "no matter what may be
the source of the dangers which threaten it," even though "the
dangers intended to be avoided arise, in whole or in part, out of
matters connected with intrastate commerce." Nevertheless, the
opinion in the Virginian Railway Company Case, like that in the
Texas & N. 0. Railway Case, leaves in doubt the continuing validity of Mr. Justice Harlan's assertion in the Adair Case that
"labor organizations have nothing to do with interstate commerce
as such," and the implication of his question, "What possible legal
or logical connection is there between an employ6's membership
in a labor organization and the carrying on of interstate comnmerce?" ° When the Virginian Railway Co'mpany Case reached
the Supreme Court, both Adair v. United States and Coppage v.
Kansas were again referred to, and again dismissed with the assurance that they had no present application, since the Railway
Labor Act does not
"interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the carrier to select its employees or to discharge them." "The provisions of the Railway Labor Act . . . neither compel the employer
4
SUnder the Adair Case the employer has a "property right" to discharge for joining a union. If he can go this far, it would seem that any
less drastic action, such as refusal to recognize representatives of employees.
or refusal to deal with representatives of employees, would also receive
constitutional protection.
49(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 641, 649. quoting Southern Ry.
Co. v. United States, (1911) 222 U. S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2, 4, 56 L. Ed. 72.
5OAdair v. United States, (1908) 208 U. S. 161. 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52
L. Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764.
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to enter into any agreement, nor preclude it front entering into
any contract with individual employees."" 1
Although the Supreme Court was unanimous in upholding
the Wagner Labor Act as applied in the Washington, Virginia
and Maryland Coach Company Case, the ghost of Adair v. United
States was not laid, for Mr. Justice McReynolds quoted from it
in the dissenting opinion in the Steel, Clothing, and Trailer Cases"
in support of his argument that
"the employer and the employee have equality of right, and any
legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference
with the liberty of contract, which no government can legally
justify in a free land."
B. TEE WAGNER DEcIsIoNS AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
1. Have the decisions given new meaning to the term "Interstate Commerce"f
"The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce

with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian Tribes." 53
What does this provision mean? The first great case interpreting this section of the constitution was Gibbons v. Ogden."
The facts were that New York had granted a monopoly to Robert
R. Livingston and Robert Fulton to ply steamboats on her waters.
This monopoly had come by mesne conveyances to the plaintiff.
Ogden. The defendant Gibbons operated two steamboats between
Elizabethtown, New Jersey and New York City, under a license
from Congress. At the time the suit was begun New York had
conferred upon the plaintiff the power to forfeit any vessel operating in New York waters without his consent. Connecticut
had passed a statute making it unlawful for a vessel to enter her
harbors if it had a license from the plaintiff. New Jersey had retaliated by passing a statute saying that if Ogden did forfeit any
vessel he would be liable for its value and treble costs. Under this
state of affairs the plaintiff obtained an injunction against the lefendant's operation of his steamboats within the territorial waters
of New York. The Supreme Court, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
writing the opinion, reversed the New York court, and held the
statute granting the plaintiff a monopoly unconstitutional. The
Chief Justice said :54a
51(1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 592, 605.
52(1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 592, 641.
53

United States constitution, art. I, sec. 8 (3).
54(1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23.
54'(1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.)

1, 187 et seq., 6 L. Ed. 23. 68 et seq.
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"This instrument [the constitution] contains an enumeration
of powers expressly granted by the people to their government.
It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly.
But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in
the constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last
of the enumerated powers, that which grants expressly, the means
of carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized 'to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper' for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used, is not
extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one
sentence in the constitution which has been pointed out by the
gentlemen at the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that
prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it....
"The words are: 'Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes.'
"The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and
not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power it becomes
necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for
the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or to
the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it coinprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce,
undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more; it is intercourse ...
"To what commerce does this power extend? The constitution informs us, to commerce 'with foreign nations, and among
the several states, and with the Indian tribes.'
"It has, we believe, been universally admitted that these words
comlprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the
United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any other, to which this power
does not extend. It has been truly said, that commerce, as the
word is used in the constitution, is a unit, every part of which is
indicated by the term.
"If this be the admitted meaning of the word, in its application to foreign nations, it mtst carry the same meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit, unless there be some plain
intelligible cause which alters it.
"The subject to which the power is next applied, is to conmerce 'among the several states.' The word 'among' means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is intermingled
wvith them. Commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state, but may be introduced into the
interior.
-It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that
colllnlrc which is completely internal, which is carried on be-
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tween man and man in a state, or between different parts of the
same state, and which does not extend to or affect other states.
Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
[Italics added.]
"Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly
be restricted to that commerce which concerns more states than
one. The phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a state, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of commerce to which the power was
to be extended, would not have been made had the intention been
to extend the power to every description. The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be exclusively internal commerce of a state. The genius and character
of the whole government seems to be, that its action is to be
applied to all external concerns of the nation, and to those internal
concerns which affect the states generally; but not to those which
are completely within a particular state, which do not affect other
states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purposes of executing some of the general powers of the government.
[Italics added.] The completely internal commerce of a state,
then, may be considered as reserved for the state itself ...
"We are now arrived at the inquiry, What is this power? It
is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power like all others vested in
Congress, is complete within itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed
in the constitution. These are explained in plain terms, and do not
affect the questions which arise in this case, or which have been
discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the
sovereignty of Congress, though limited to. specific objects is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, is vested in Congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its
constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as
are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom
and discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the
influence which their constituents possess at the elections are, in
this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure
them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments."
From this long excerpt from the chief justice's opinion it is
dear that the Court at that time thought that the constitution was
entitled to a fair interpretation and not a strict one; that the word
"commerce" was not limited in its meaning to transportation, nor

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

to acts which directly interfered with or burdened transportation,
or had to do with the instrumentalities of transportation. Those
would constitute only one phase of "commerce." So much is
clear from the view that navigation, trade and traffic were only
some of the different sorts of commerce, but did not exhaust the
meaning of that term. The only power left to the states was the
control over internal commerce of a state, which would have to
yield to the power of Congress if it affected other states. It seems
clear that the chief justice would have no hesitation in subjecting
a business orjindustry to the control of Congress if it affected
the economic welfare of people beyond the limits of a state, whether
or not its goods had taken a journey. Finally, Ch'ef Justice Marshall did not doubt that the power granted to Congress acknowvledges no limitations unless found within the constitution itself.
The tenth amendment, which later loomed so large in decisions
of the Court, had been part of the constitution for thirty-three
years when Marshall rendered this opinion. If it was intended
as a limitation on the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, it never occurred to the chief justice to mention it, although
he discussed the whole subject at great length. At least it did
not forestall Marshall's view that Congress had the same power
over interstate commerce that it had over foreign commerce.?
The chief justice felt constrained to sound a note of warning
at the end of his opinion. He said:
"Powerful and ingenious minds, taking, as postulates, that the
powers expressly granted to the government of the Union are to
be contracted, by construction, into the narrowest possible compass, and that the original powers of the states are retained, if
any possible construction will retain them, may, by a course of
well-digested, but refined and metaphysical reasoning, founded on
these premises, explain away the constitution of our country, and
leave it a magnificent structure indeed, to look at, but totally
unfit for use. They may so entangle and perplex the understanding, as to obscure principles which were before thought quite
plain, and induce doubts where, if the mind were to pursue its
own course, none would be perceived. In such a case, it is peculiarly necessary fo recur to safe and fundamental principles to
sustain those principles, and, when sustained, to make them the
tests of the arguments to be examined."
55
Almost the same quotations from Gibbons v. Ogden as those used
in the text are the basis for a much fuller discussion in Professor Edward
S. Corwin's, The Commerce Power v. State Rights 5-52. Though the
writer of this portion of the present article had prepared his original draft
before reading Professor Corwin's book, he recognizes the priority of
Professor Corwin's thoughtful consideration of the subject.
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The chief justice probably spoke with greater prophetic vision
than he realized. What he feared is just-what seems to have happened later. In 1915 Professor Dudley 0. McGovney defined intersfate commerce thus:
"The test, then, as to an interstate transaction, is not whether
it takes place between inhabitanrs of different states, but whether
the transaction involves transportation of property, persons or intelligence from one state to another, or is a necessary incident
to accomplishing the transit or transportation, or to making it
fruitful.""
Professor McGovney's definition was an epitome of the Supreme
Court decisions as they stood at that time, with the possible exception of a few cases involving the Sherman Anti-Trust Law.
At that time the word "transportation" had been substituted for
the word "commerce," in the sense that Marshall understood the
word. And there is no question that the McGovney definition
was an accurate reflection of the decisions of that time, because
they are replete with such expressions as "the interstate journey
had ended" or "the interstate journey had not yet begun." The
central theme was a journey of something from one state to
another. The same author continues :*7
"So if A owns a stock of goods in Illinois, and while in
Ohio makes a contract to sell the goods to B, who lives in Ohio,
this is not a -transaction of interstate commerce; but if A contracts to sell and ship the. goods to B, it would be; at least so
far as the performance of the contract is concerned.
"The Supreme Court has held that insurance contracts, fire,
life or marine [citations omitted], made between an insurance
company of one state and an insurer in another, are not transactions of interstate commerce. Why is not a contract between
a New York insurance company and a man in Iowa, to insure the
latter's life or house, a transaction of interstate commerce? The
answer seems to be that the contract of insurance only makes the
company in New York a debtor. The entire operation of the contract is in New York. The contract does not necessarily contemplate
the transportation or transit of anything from New York to Iowa.
The insured is free to collect his money in New York, and stay
there with it. True, the insured may collect in Iowa, but that
is due to the general principle that a debt may be sued upon
wherever a court gets jurisdiction over the debtor.
"Clearly the manufacture of goods, even though the goods are
intended to be shipped to other states, is not interstate commerce
AeMcGovney,

213. 57

Law of Interstate Commerce, in 12 Mod. Am. Law 205,

McGovney, Law of Interstate Commerce, 12 Mod. Am. Law 205.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[citing a case]; it is not commerce at all. Manufacturing, mining, fishing, farming, in short production, must precede commerce,
but they are not commerce."
This summary of decisions is intended to show that all the
different species of interstate commerce, except transportation,
had, by this time, been forgotten. But the climax of this development was not reached until 1918, in the case of Hammer v.
Dagenhart5 8 That case held that the tenth amendment prohibited
Congress from barring commodities from interstate commerce unless there was something wrong with the commodity. The Court
quoted from Gibbons v.Ogden and continued:
" ...In other words, the power is one to control the means
by which commerce is carried on, which is directly the contrary
of the assumed right to forbid commerce from moving and thus
destroy it as to particular commodities."
The Court in this case narrowed the power of Congress not
only to transportation, but to the means of transportation. Congress could not prohibit commodities moving in that transportation unless they were inherently bad or sinful. That there be
no question that the Court interpreted "commerce" as synonymous
with "transportation," the following is quoted from the opinion:
"Over interstate transportation, or its incidents, the regulatory
power of Congress is ample, but the production of articles intended for interstate commerce is a matter of local regulation. When
the commerce begins is determined not by the character of the
commodity, nor by the intention of the owner to transfer it to
another state for sale, nor by his preparation of it for transportation, -but by its actual delivery to a common carrier for transportation or the actual commencement of its transfer to another
state."
Here the Court is using the words "commerce" and "transportation" interchangeably.
Four members of the Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart felt
that the majority had fallen victims to the "powerful and ingenious minds" which the great chief justice had warned against.
Furthermore, the majority overlook that part of Marshall's opinion which stated that the clause was a unit and that Congress has
power over commerce among the states just as it has power over
foreign commerce. And it would seem that the chief justice was
correct, for the word "commerce" is used but once in the clause,
58(1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101, 3 A. L. R.
649, Ann. Cas. 1918E 724. And see Corwin, The Commerce Power v.
State Rights 13 et seq., 48 et seq., Willis, Constitutional Law of the

United States 286.
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providing that Congress has power to regulate "commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states." No one would
dispute the fact that Congress can prohibit absolutely the importation of foreign goods for any reason it pleases, or for no
reason at all. Hammer v.Dagenlwrt means then that the single
word "commerce" has two separate and distinct meanings in the
same clause which Marshall described as a unit. 9
Little argument would have been needed to convince John
Marshall that the majority was wrong. Can anyone say that the
child-labor problem is one confined to one state and that low
standards in one state do not affect standards elsewhere? A
manufacturer in a low standard state has a distinct advantage
over his competitor in a high standard state not only in the interstate market but in the home market of the high standard state
as well. But under the majority decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, neither the federal government nor the state, nor both of
them, could protect the manufacturer in the high standard state.
Before the constitution was adopted, a state could protect its
own manufacturers by prohibiting the importation of goods. Prior
to the decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart it was the general opinion
that the constitution merely divided the power to regulate commerce, but the majority held, in effect, that part of it had been
lost-that a "no-man's land" had been created.
This background is important in estimating the meaning of
the Wagner Act decisions. On February 12, 1937, sixty days
before the Supreme Court decided the Wagner Act Cases, the
circuit court of appeals for the first circuit handed down its decision in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporalion.ea In
this case the Shipbuilding Corporation and a company union.
which was prohibited by the Wagner Act, had secured an injunction against the National Labor Relations Board, to prevent the
board from proceeding with complaints of unfair labor practices.
The circuit court of appeals, reviewing the litigation on this subject, said:
"The case is by no means of the first impression. Cases involving the powers and jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board have already arisen and been decided in the second,
59 Corwin, The Commerce Power v. State Rights 50: "But that a word
should have two quite different meanings in a single short sentence in
which it occurs but oce, is certainly a novelty to the science of hermeneutics
and probably to that of linguistics as well."
6o(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 154, 155.
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fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth circuits, some as in this case
on proceedings to enjoin hearings, some on petitions to review
orders made by the board, and some on petitions by the board
for enforcement of its orders. Where the question was presented it has uniformly been held that the act does not apply to
manufacturers. Such persons are not engaged in interstate commerce and their relations with their employees are within the jurisdiction of the state rather than of the national government
[citing cases]."
The court continued:
'" ... On the present state of the law there would seem to be
only slight probability that any order which might be made by the
"
board in this case would be enforced ...
The court was also of the opinion that the fact that respondent obtained much of its raw material from outside the state in
which it was located and sent its finished products out of the state
had not the effect of making the business a part of interstate commerce.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
6
' decided by the circuit court of appeals for the fifth
Corporation,
15, 1936, the court said:
on
June
circuit
"The National Labor Relations Board has petitioned us to
enforce an order made by it, which required Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation, organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, to
reinstate certain discharged employees in its steel plant in Aliquippa, Pa., and to do other things in that connection.
"The petition must be denied because, under the facts found
by the board and shown by the evidence, the board has no jurisdiction over a labor dispute between employer and employees
touching the discharge of laborers in a steel plant, who were engaged only in manufacture. The constitution does not vest in the
federal government the power to regulate the relation as such of
employer and employee in production or manufacture."
The court then quoted from the case of Carter v. Carter Coal
Company,6 2 decided by the Supreme Court on May 18, 1936, less
than a year before the time the Court rendered the Wagner Act
decisions. This quotation reads:
"One who produces or manufactures a commodity, subsequently sold and shipped by him in interstate commerce, whether
such sale or shipment were originally intended or not, has engaged in two and separate activities. So far as he produces or
manufactures a commodity, his business is purely local. So far
as he sells and ships, or contracts to sell and ship, the commodity
to customers in another state, he engages in interstate commerce.
61(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1936) 83 F. (2d) 998.
02(1936) 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160.
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In respect to the former, he is subject only to regulation by the
state; in respect ot the latter, to regulation only by the federal
government [citing a case]. Production is not commerce; but a
step in preparation for commerce [citing a case].
"We have seen that the word 'commerce' is the equivalent
of the phrase 'intercourse for the purposes of trade.' Plainly
the incidents leading up to and culminating in the mining of coal
do not constitute such intercourse. The employment of men, the
fixing of their wages, hours of labor, and working conditions, the
bargaining in respect of these things-whether carried on separately or collectively--each and all constitute intercourse for the
purposes of production, not of trade. The latter is a thing apart
from the relation of employer and employee, which in all producing operations is purely local in character. Extraction of coal
from the mine is the aim and the completed result of local activities. Commerce in the coal mined is not brought into being by
force of these activities, but by negotiations, agreements, and circumstances entirely apart from production. Mining brings the
subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes
of it."
The circuit court of appeals then applied this reasoning to the
facts of the Jones & Laughlin Case. The underlying thought is
clear. The Supreme Coure had limited the power of the national
government to interstate transportation. Nothing can be transported until after mining or manufacture. Production of an article is preparatory to transportation-hence it is local in its nature and beyond the power of the federal government to regulate.
So it was in the other circuit courts of appeals. In the case
of National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Company,63 decided July 13, 1936, in the second circuit,
the court said:
"The relations between the employer and its employees in this
manufacturing industry were merely incidents of production. In
its manufacturing, respondent was in no way engaged in interstate commerce, nor did its labor practices so directly affect interstate commerce as to come within the federal commerce power.
Carterv. Carter Coal Co. 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160, May 18,
1936; Schechter Poultry Corporationv. Uniled States, 295 U. S.
495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 97 A. L, R. 947. No authority warrants the conclusion that the powers of the federal government permit the regulation of the dealings between employers
or employees when engaged in the purely local business of manufacture."
In Schechter Poidtry Corp. v. United States (decided May 27,
1935), relied upon by the circuit court of appeals, it was held that
6385 F. (2d) 1 (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1936).
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the sale of poultry in New York was not interstate commerce,
although 96 per cent of it came from other states, and the sale of
sick chickens in violation of the Code had so demoralized the
market as to cut importations 20 per cent. Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, speaking for the Court, said:
"Were the transactions 'in' interstate commerce? Much is
made of the fact that almost all the poultry coming to New York
is sent there from other states. But the code provisions as here
applied do not concern the transportation of the poultry from
other states to New York, or the transactions of the commission
men or others to whom it is consigned, or the sales made by s'uch
consignees to defendants.
"When the defendants had made their purchases, whether at
the West Washington Market in New York City or at the railroad terminals serving the city, or elsewhere, the poultry was
trucked to their slaughterhouses in Brooklyn for local disposition.
"The interstate transactions in relation to that poultry then
ended. Defendants held the poultry at their slaughterhouse markets for slaughter and local sale to retail dealers and butchers,
who in turn sold directly to consumers.
"Neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were
transactions in interstate commerce [citing cases].
"The undisputed facts thus afford no warrant for the argument that the poultry handled by the defendants at their slaughterhouse markets was in the 'current' or 'flow' of interstate
commerce and was thus subject to congressional regulation.
"The mere fact that there may be a constant flow of commodities into a state does not mean that the flow continues after
the property has arrived and has become commingled with the
mass of property within the state and is there held solely for local
disposition and use. So far as the poultry herein questioned is
concerned, the flow in interstate commerce had ceased.
"The poultry had come to a permanent rest within the state.
It was not held, used or sold by the defendants in relation to any
further transaction in interstate commerce and was not destined
for transportation to other states. Hence, decisions which deal
with a stream of interstate commerce-where goods come to rest
within a state temporarily and are later to go forward in interstate commerce-and with the regulation of transactions involved
in that practical continuity of movement, are not applicable here
[citing cases].
"Did the defendant's transactions directly 'affect' interstate
commerce so as to be subject to federal regulation? ...

In deter-

mining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the ground that they 'affect' interstate
commerce, there is a necessary and well-established distinction
between direct and indirect effects. .

.

. Direct effects are illus-
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trated by the railroad cases we have cited, as e.g., the effect of
failure to use prescribed safety appliances on railroads which are
the highways of both interstate and intrastate commere. ... But
where the effect of intrastate transportations upon interstate commerce is merely indirect, such transactions remain within the domain of state power.
"If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect
effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people and the authority
of the state over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal government."
But so completely do these principles seem to have been overthrown in the Wagner Act decisions that one writer declares that
they "create a new United States."'" In the Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation Case the board found unfair labor practices in
the corporation's Aliquippa, Pa. plant, and issued an order applying to production workers. The record showed that all the raw
material coming to the plant was stored from three weeks to
three months before it was used. It had not only "come to rest"
but had been at rest a long time before it was used. Most of
the finished products were not manufactured on contract, but
were sold afterwards. Raw materials in storehouses, and finished
products before being billed in interstate commerce, are subject to
state taxation under Coe v.Errol,65 although the states cannot tax
property or goods in interstate commerce. The Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Company Case involved production employees. In
the Trailer Case the board's order affected both production and
maintenance employees. So sure were counsel that the activities
of these employees were not interstate commerce and that, as to
them, the Wagner Act could not be applied constitutionally, that
they did not bother to make a defense except to object to the jurisdiction of the board. The majority do not purport to overrule any
of these prior decisions, nor do they define interstate commerce.
64"A small clothing factory in Richmond, Virginia, imports materials
from other states, transforms them into wearing apparel, and sells the result
in all the forty-eight states. This again is 'interstate commerce,' subject
to supervision under the historic phrase. It is not necessary to dissect
the already celebrated opinion further- to point out fine, metaphysical
distinctions that make one commercial transaction a Congressional object
of attention and leave the other out, and to reconcile the latest definition
with previous judicial attempts to explain a controverted sentence. What
may fairly be said is that the five decisions rendered on April 12, 1937,
create a new United States. The reign of Congress is now so sweeping
that the Republic, in matters of industry, perhaps of agriculture, has become an integrated nation." Hendrick, Bulwark of the Republic xx-.od.
65(1886) 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475, 29 L.Ed. 715.
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The Jones & Laughlin Case is well epitomized by a newspaper
comment which appeared the day after the decisions were handed
down, reading :16
"Supporters of the president's argument that his troubles have
been due to the judiciary and not to the constitution emphasized
that under the practical formula set forth by Chief Justice Hughes
today what is and what is not within the federal power to regulate commerce becomes purely a matter on which the court will
judge according to the practical experience and views of a majority of its members and not in accordance with any scheme which
can be precisely defined in legal language."
How far the Court will go no one can say.6' The Court held
the Act applicable to the Clothing Company, which is a small concern employing 800 men. There are 3,300 similar plants in the
country. The Trailer Company employed 900 men. The chief
justice emphasizes the practical aspects of the cases. He describes
the far-flung activities of the Jones & Laughlin Company--control of steamers on the Great Lakes, railroads, ore mines, coal
fields, warehouses in various parts of the country, sales offices in
many large cities, and nineteen subsidiary corporations-and because of these facts he refuses to segregate the employees in the
production plant at Aliquippa. On that subject he says:
"We do not find it necessary to determine whether these features of the defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy
to the 'stream of commerce' cases. The instances in which that
metaphor has been used are but particular, and not exclusive,
illustrations of the protective power which the government invokes in support of the present act. The Congressional authority
.to protect interstate commerce from burdens and obstructions is
not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign commerce ......
How far the government's power extends away from the "flow"
of interstate commerce is, says the chief justice, necessarily a
question of degree.
In what direction is the Court presently headed? Do the decisions of last April 12 adopt the principles laid down by John
Marshall one hundred and thirteen years ago, or have we now
simply a glorified interpretation of the transportation doctrine?
The following excerpt from the opinion in the Jones & Laughlin
Steel Case is probably the best answer the decisions afford:
"ONew York Herald-Tribune, April 13, 1937.

67See Mueller, Businesses Subject to the National Labor Relations
Act, (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1286.

THE WAGNER LABOR ACT CASES

"Giving full weight to respondent's contention with respect
to a break in the complete continuity of the 'stream of commerce'
by reason of respondent's manufacturing operations, the fact
remains that the stoppage of those operations by industrial
strife would have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce.
In view of respondent's far-flung activities, it is idle to say that
the effect would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would
be immediate and might be catastrophic. We are asked to shut
our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with
the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual.vacuum.
Because there may be but indirect and remote effects upon interstate commerce in connection with a host of local enterprises
throughout the country, it does not follow that other industrial activities do not have such a dose and intimate relation to interstate commerce as to make the presence of industrial strife a matter of the most urgent national concern. When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how
can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when it
is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing
consequences of industrial war?"
Four of the justices dissented in the manufacturing cases, Mr.
Justice McReynolds writing the opinion. In his view the majority
hld overruled the Schechter Case and the Carter Coal Company
Case. Further, he stated that the circuit judges were right in relying on these cases, and intimated that the opinion of the Court was
perhaps not fair to the circuit judges who had based their opinions
on the most recent decisions of the Court. And it can hardly be
questioned that Justice McReynolds' argument is better than that
of the majority, if reliance is to be placed on the precedents since
1904." The majority, however, are more in accord with Marshall's concept of interstate commerce.
The opinion of the Court does not purport to overrrule any
of the cases with which it is in apparent conflict. Therefore they
are presumed to be good law. In fact the majority opinion is
so general that one can find argument in it to sustain decisions
either way when the next Wagner Act cases come before the
Court. Under the decisions as they now stand, the Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corporation would be subject to a state excise tax
on manufacturing because it is a local businesg, but yet the same
manufacturing is interstate in the sense that the federal government can compel the company to bargain collectively with employees. On the other hand, employees could burn the factory
sSee Corwin, The Commerce Power versus State Rights 24, 38, 44.
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down, yet under the Coronado Coal Coinpany Case"' the federal
government could do nothing about it. Congress could forbid
importation of foreign goods for any reason or for no reason at
all, but cannot prohibit child-made goods from moving in interstate commerce. Congress may prohibit lottery tickets from moving in interstate commerce, not because they are inherently dangerous or bad, but because they are considered sinful. Agriculture and mining are still local industries, although interstate commerce might be said to be a dominant factor in their activities. It
is impossible to find these distinctions in what the Court has called
"the plain words of the constitution," but they arise out of the
bewildering variety of precedents which still must be presumed to
speak with authority, subject to the final choice of the Court. No
one can predict the final effect of these controversial cases.
2. May the Decisions be rested Upon the Power of Congress
to Regulate "Burdens" upon Interstate Commerce, although the
Burdens exist in Intrastate Commerce?
It is not clear, in the Jones & Laughlin Case, whether the
Court really bases its decision on the meaning of the term "interstate commerce" or not. The quotation on page 24 suggests that
the Court looks upon the precise meaning of the term as not being
involved in a decision of the case, since the Court says that Congress has authority to protect interstate commerce from burdens
and obstructions which are not an essential part of its "flow." t 0 In
other words, in spite of the fact that in the decisions under the
Wagner Act the Supreme Court seems to have turned back to the
views of Marshall, rejecting what it had said previously in many
cases which, over a long period of years, narrowly limited the constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce among
the states, nevertheless it is possible to view the Wagner Act Cases
as coming within the doctrine that Congress may protect interstate
commerce from threats of burdens or obstructions from without.
A number of writers have insisted with some vehemence that these
decisions have not widened the meaning of the term "interstate
commerce," but that they recognize and apply an established rule.
that Congress may legislate with respect to activities that burden
6
DUnless the unlawful act is done with the intent to affect interstate
commerce. See Coronado Coal Company v. United Mine Workers of
America, (1925) 268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551, 69 L. Ed. -963.

70(1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 615,

624.
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it, though these activities may themselves be wholly outside of commerce between the states.
"Burdens and obstructions," said Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
in the Jones & Laughdin Case "may be due to injurious action
springing from other sources [than interstate commerce]. The
fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is
the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for its 'protection
and advancement' (The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564, 19 L Ed.
999)."
And in a brief discussion of the cases in a recent issue of the
Georgetown Law Journal, 71 a writer says that
"The scope of the term 'interstate commerce,' as it has previously been understood and interpreted remains the same. The
decisions must be limited to the admittedly serious effect of labor
disputes and disorders on the 'free flow of interstate commerce.'
Nowhere in any of the majority decisions can it be found or even
inferentially stated that there is now vested in Congress, as a result thereof, the power to regulate and control the internal affairs
of a business of a purely intrastate character where there can be
found no serious restriction or burden on the free flow of commerce between the states."
A like view was entertained by Mr. David Lawrence, who wrote
on April 14, 1937, in a syndicated article entitled "An Independent
Judiciary," in part as follows :72

"The Supreme Court has, in effect, told a hesitant, wavering,
doubtful Congress that the federal government does have power
to protect interstate commerce against the impediments and obstructions which grow out of serious labor disputes.
"Thoroughly consistent with previous opinions, the Supreme
Court has merely called attention with renewed emphasis to a decision rendered in May, 1925, known as the second Cormado
Case, which governs almost identically conditions such as exist
today.
"No new commerce clause has been written into the Constitution, but a definition of what really constitutes obstruction of interstate commerce has been restated with remarkable clarity and
force.
"The American people generally have won a great victory.
Labor, in particular, that is honest, decent, law-abiding labor, has
won a triumph unexcelled in American history ...
"The Court has pointed out that production itself may still
be local, just as it was in the coal mining case [the second
Coronado Case], but that physical acts or obstruction could interfere with the movement of goods."
The draftsmen of the National Labor Relations Act were
71
72 Mr.

Robert McMillan, (1937) 25 Geo. L. J. 951.
And.see (1937) 37 Colum. L. Rev. 860, 861.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

faced with the problem of preparing a statute which should apply
as widely as possible the principles of collective bargaining in labor
relations. They could have limited the scope of the Act to labor
disputes occurring in interstate commerce, subject to the varying
definitions of that term which the Supreme Court might from time
to time adopt.73 It would seem fairly obvious, from a reading
of the plain words of the constitution, giving Congress power to
regulate commerce among the states, that labor disputes in interstate commerce would be subject to regulation as a part of that
commerce, and under the Railway Labor Act and the Texas &
N. 0. Railway Case which upheld it, that must have seemed to
the draftsmen of the Wagner Act established as law, subject to
the Adair Case. For it must not be forgotten that the Adair Case
was not overruled by the Texas & N. 0. Railway Case, and that,
in the Adair Case the Court took the view that a labor organization whose membership was employed by an interstate carrier,
had, nevertheless, no. such substantial relation to or connection
with interstate commerce as to authorize Congress to impose criminal penalties for discharging an employee because of his union
membership. Said Mr. Justice Harlan:7'
" . . .What possible legal or logical connection is there between an employe's membership in a labor organization and the
carrying on of interstate commerce? . . . It is the employ6 as
a man, and not as a member of a labor organization who labors in
the service of an interstate carrier."
Nevertheless, in prosecutions and suits under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, forbidding combinations and conspiracies in restraint of interstate commerce, it has been held that the Sherman
Act "prohibits any combination whatever to secure action which
essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce between the states ;"
and that this prohibition includes combinations of labor;" that
obstructions of business not a part of interstate commerce by combinations of labor intended to restrain interstate commerce, or
where that would be the necessary effect of the combination, are
subject to the prohibition ;76 in other words, that acts of labor or-

488.

"sSee supra, pages 13-26.
74(1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764.
75Loewe v. Lawlor, (1908) 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, 52 L. Ed.
8

United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Company,
(1922) 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975, 27 A. L. R. 762:
"Coal mining is not interstate commerce, and the power of Congress does
not extend to its regulation as such ....

And so in the case at bar, . . .

obstruction of coal mining, though it may prevent coal from going into
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ganizations in businesses themselves either within or without interstate commerce, may constitute an obstruction of interstate

commerce such as to come within the regulatory power of Congress, subject to the requirement that if the acts occur in intrastate
commerce, they must "affect" interstate commerce "directly."
It would seem to follow that some labor disputes in intrastate
commerce would in all probability be subject to federal legislation,
since their necessary effect, or their intended effect, could be to
impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce. Such labor
disputes and strikes could be regulated by Congress. The regula-

tion might legally be directed toward encouraging collective bargaining in order to discourage strikes. This theory finds expression in the National Labor Relations Act, which says :1
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
elidnate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practices and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment,
or other mutual aid or protection." [Italics added].
But it may as well be admitted that this theory, as a basis
for the regulation of labor disputes by Congress, is elusive and
indefinite.78 Alone, it is hardly likely to be a satisfactory test of
the proper scope of contemplated legislation. We say that if a
labor dispute in interstate or intrastate commerce is intended to,
or by "necessary effect" will "directly" "burden" interstate commerce, then the dispute may be "regulated" by Congress to protect interstate commerce. Admitting that words are never entirely
clear, yet there are degrees of exactness and clarity. The applicability of the Act to new businesses can never be foretold with
any sort of certainty under the burden doctrine. It would be much
better, it would seem, to turn back again to the theories of John
Marshall as to the true meaning of interstate commerce. In
fact it may be that the burden theory is nothing but a survival of
his long-forgotten views. Nevertheless, this approach overcomes
interstate commerce, is not a restraint of that commerce, unless the obstruction is intended to restrain commerce in it, or necessarily has such a
direct, material and substantial effect, to restrain it that the intent reasonably must be inferred."

7(1935) 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 151, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec.
151. 78See Willis, Constitutional Law 341-342.
See Stout v. Pratt, (D.C. Mo. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 864, 869.
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difficulties due to the opinion expressed by the Court in the Adair
Case, that labor organizations and membership in them are not
subject to the regulatory power of Congress as a part of interstate commerce, even where members of the union are engaged
solely by interstate carriers. It also extends the power of Congress to labor difficulties admittedly outside the scope of interstate commerce, whatever definition we give it, where the
combination of workmen, by intent, or by necessary effect, will
79
obstruct interstate commerce.
C. THE AssocIATED PRESS CASE.
Of the five cases decided in April, 1937, upholding the National Labor Relations Act, Associated Press v. National Labor
Relations Board0 involved some questions of importance peculiar
to itself. Morris Watson, employed by the Associated Press in
its New York office as an editorial employee in the News Department, was discharged in October, 1935. The American Newspaper Guild filed a charge with the board, alleging the discharge to be in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, in
that it was due to Watson's activities in connection with the Newspaper Guild. Upon the recommendation of the Trial Examiner,
the board entered an order against the Associated Press, based
on findings that Watson had been discharged in violation of the
Act. The order required the Associated Press to restore Watson
to duty, and to make him whole for any losses he had sustained.
His employers refused to comply and the board then petitioned
the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit to enforce the
order. This it did, by a decree after argument. In the argument,
however, the board's findings of fact were not challenged, and the
only point raised was the constitutionality of the Act.
The case was taken thence to the Supreme Court of the United
States. The Supreme Court held, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Roberts, that the facts accepted as proved constituted unfair labor
practices affecting interstate commerce, that the Act did not infringe freedom of speech as guaranteed by the first amendment,
nor the right to trial by jury, under the seventh. On the first
point the Court relied on the authority of Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co.
v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks,81 and Virginian Ry. Co. v.
System Federation No. 40.82 The third point, as to the right to a
79(1937) 37 Colum. L. Rev. 860, 861, note 10..
80(1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 650.

81(1930) 281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427, 74 L. Ed. 1034.
82(1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 592.
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jury trial, was disposed of without discussion by reference to the
Texas & N. 0. Ry. and the Jones & Laughlin Cases.8 But as
to whether or not the Act, as applied to the Associated Press,
abridged the guarantees of the first amendment the Court cited
no authority directly in point. Holding that the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press were not
infringed, Mr. Justice Roberts said:
"The conclusion which the [Associated Press] draws is that
whatever may be the case with respect to employees in its mechanical departments, it must have absolute and unrestricted freedom
to employ and to discharge those who, like Watson, edit the
news, that there must not be the slightest opportunity for any
bias or prejudice personally entertained by an editorial employee
to color or to distort what he writes, and that the Associated Press
cannot be free to furnish unbiased and impartial news reports
unless it is equally free to determine for itself the partiality or
bias of editorial employees.
"So it is said that any regulation protective of union activities,
or the right collectively to bargain on the part of such employees,
is necessarily an invalid invasion of the freedom of the press.
"We think that the contention not only has no relevance to
the circumstances of the instant case but is an unsound generalization....
"The Act . . . does not require the [Associated Press] to
retain in its employ an incompetent editor or one who fails faithfully to edit the news to reflect the facts without bias or prejudice.
The Act permits a discharge for any reason other than union activity or agitation for collective bargaining with employees."
Disagreement upon the freedom of the press features of the
Act, as applied to the Associated Press, was the basis for Mr.
Justice Sutherland's dissenting opinion, in which he said in part,
with the concurrence of Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and
Butler :"4
"The findings of the board disclose that Watson continued
in various ways to promote the interests of the guild: and there
is no doubt that his sympathies were strongly enlisted in support
of the guild's policies, whether they clashed with the policies of
[his employer] or not. We do not question his right to assume
and maintain that attitude. But, if [the Associated Press] concluded, as it well could have done, that its policy to preserve its
news service free from color, bias, or distortion was likely to be
subverted by Watson's retention, what power had Congress to
interfere in the face of the first amendment ?"
It is suggested that in this passage the dissenting members of the
83(1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 615.
84(1937)

57 Sup. Ct. 615, 659.
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Court fail to recognize a necessary distinction-that between discharging an employee because he is a member of a union, or
engaged in union activities, which the Act forbids, and discharging an employee for any other reasons, good or bad, including even
a mistaken belief that the employee is coloring the news. Discharges of the latter sort are not forbidden. This difference
is recognized in the opinion of the majority, where the Court says:
"The business of the Associated Press is not immune from
regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of
a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and
liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of court. He is subject to the anti-trust laws.
. . . The regulation here in question has no relation whatever to
the impartial distribution of the news ....
[The Associated Press]
is free at any time to discharge Watson or any editorial employee
who fails to comply with the policies it may adopt."
CONCLUSION

In several important respects the Wagner Labor Disputes
Act cases, decided by the Supreme Court in April, 1937, will
probably long remain landmarks in constitutional law, and among
the most important labor decisions of all time. In the first place,
they indicate a return to a less artificial view of the term "interstate commerce." Not less important, they deal with facts of national existence in a realistic way, and in so doing, have apparently rejected in all respects the harsh emotionalism of Adair v.
United States. That a unanimous Court upheld the Act in the
Coach Company Case certainly occasioned surprise. It may, perhaps, without disrespect, be sugges'ted that the Court reacted to
the critical spirit of the times.8 5 But the division of opinion in
the other cases is warning of storms to come, for the importance
of the National Labor Relations Act to labor is not the mere
fact of its constitutionality, but the elasticity of the constitutional
limits of its application. If the language of the five original cases
is too obscure to permit present agreement as to their true meaning and the precise theory upon which they have reconciled conflicting precedents of the past, it is not unlikely that future cases
will furnish opportunity for distinctions so subtle and so refined
85"The fact that the 'Court Plan' had been introduced shortly before

the decision in the [Jones & Laughlin] case suggests that too sanguine
an attitude toward the liberalization of the Courts concept of interstate
commerce may not be warranted." (1937) 37 Colum. L. Rev. 861.
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that no decision of the Court will again go so far as the original
five. 6 And it is doubtful whether these cases have clarified a
tradition which made it necessary for the Court, whether by conscious choice or not, in borderline cases, to deny validity to an acf
of Congress because the subject-matter to be regulated was not a
part of interstate commerce, or, with equally good precedents to
cite, to uphold legislation deemed to be desirable, because it protected interstate commerce from burdens or obstructions threatened
from without.
8
6Extra-legal attacks upon the Act and the board were not to end with
the Supreme Court decisions. For example, an Associated Press dispatch
from Nashville, Tennessee, August 3, 1937, reads, in part: "The Nashville
Chamber of Commerce condemned the Wagner Labor Relations Act Tuesday as 'one-sided, biased and arbitrary' and recommended that it be
amended 'so that the same tribunal shall not be both prosecutor and judge.'
The action was taken by the board of governors in adopting a resolution
which embodied also a recommendation that the act be amended 'to make
labor organizations legally responsible for the actions of their members
and agdnts, so that all contracts entered into between employers and
employes would be equally binding and enforceable.' . . " This sort of
attack, however, was not new. To previous ones Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
had replied in the Jones & Laughlin Case, (1937) 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 628:
"The Act hds been criticized as one-sided in its application. . . . We have
frequently said that the legislative authority, exerted within its proper
field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach. The constitution does
not forbid 'cautious advance, step by step,' .. ." And see note 33, supra.

